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ECtHR engages in dangerous  “triple pirouette” to find criminal prosecution for media 
coverage of PKK statements did not violate Article 10    
 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh and Dirk Voorhoof 
 
The European Court’s Second Section recently found that criminal proceedings against the 
owner and the editor of a newspaper for having published statements by the leader of a 
terrorist organisation were justified and did not violate the right to freedom of expression. 
The Court in Gürbüz and Bayar v. Turkey found that the newspaper’s article with statements 
by the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, contained and implied a threat of resumption of 
violence. In its approach and finding no violation of freedom of expression under Article 10 
ECHR, the Court itself made an assessment of the context and content of the article at issue, 
as the Turkish courts had restricted themselves to the finding of the illegal character of 
reproducing the statements of the PKK-leader as such, without further evaluating the 
necessity of the interference in a democratic society. 
 
One can seriously question however whether it is the task of the ECtHR to regularise this 
omission by the domestic authorities. More substantially: by finding that the dissemination of 
one particular statement by Öcalan justified the criminal prosecution for journalistic reporting 
at the occasion of a ceasefire proposal in the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, the ECtHR neglects to 
verify the basic conditions of ‘intent’ and ‘clear and imminent danger’ in order to qualify the 
newspaper article at issue as an incitement to terrorist violence. The Court also showed 
insufficient attention to the role of journalism and media when reporting on matters of public 
interest and disseminating statements of others. These three turns by the Court were labelled 
by the dissent as a ‘triple  pirouette’ that ‘ignore[d] fundamental aspects’ of ‘well-
established’ Article 10 jurisprudence. 
  
Facts 
 
The applicants in the case were the publisher and editor-in-chief of the Turkish daily 
newspaper Ülkede Özgür Gündem. Criminal proceedings were brought against them for 
publishing statements by Abdullah Öcalan, the head of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), 
and Murat Karayılan, the president of Kongra-Gel, a PKK branch, in an article which 
appeared in the newspaper in September 2004, reporting on a ceasefire proposal by Kongra-
Gel, and that organisation’s calls for an end to the armed conflict. Öcalan stated that he 
approved this proposal and called on the authorities to give immediate effect to the 
organisation’s claims, emphasising the need to develop Turkish-Kurdish dialogue. If the 
dialogue and peace-process would fail, although this was not desirable, 2005 would 
necessarily be a year of transition to guerrilla warfare. Öcalan also called on Kurdish patriots 
to gather under the banner of Kongra-Gel. For his part, Karayılan emphasised that peace in 
the region would come about through recognition and respect for the rights of the Kurdish 
people and he called on the State to open up dialogue with the Kurdish representatives to find 
a democratic and peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem, stressing in particular, that he was 
willing to disarm if the conditions were right. 
 
In 2007 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted Gürbüz and Bayar of the offence of publishing 
statements by a terrorist organisation, under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) 
and both were ordered to pay a fine. In 2012 the Court of Cassation held that the criminal 
proceedings against Gürbüz were time-barred, while Bayar’s sentence finally was suspended. 
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Relying on their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR Gürbüz and Bayar 
complained about the criminal proceedings brought against them. 
 
Judgment 
 
First the ECtHR referred to the right of member states to defend themselves against terrorism  
and that a ‘fair balance’ needs to be struck between the individual’s fundamental right to 
freedom of expression and a democratic society’s legitimate right to protect itself against the 
activities of terrorist organisations. Next the ECtHR emphasised the principle that the mere 
fact of having published statements by terrorist organisations could not justify media 
professionals being systematically convicted by the courts without an analysis of the content 
of the contested articles or the context in which they were written (see Gözel and Özer v. 
Turkey). The ECtHR also observed that virulent criticism on the government by a terrorist 
organisation cannot justify in itself a criminal conviction of the editors or journalists 
reporting such statements. However, the Court reiterated that when it came to statements 
which could be held to amount to hate speech or glorification of or incitement to violence, it 
analysed itself the contested articles, notwithstanding the fact that the reasons given by the 
courts for the convictions in question had been clearly insufficient. Also in the case at issue 
the ECtHR considered the motivation for the applicants’ conviction by the Turkish courts 
insufficient and even completely absent (‘insuffisante ou même absente’), and decided to 
analyse itself the content and context of the statements at issue. 
 
The Court noted that the statements made by Karayılan were somewhat peaceful in nature; 
they did not seem such as to incite to the commission of violent acts, or their continuance. In 
contrast, although Öcalan indicated his support for Kongra-Gel’s ceasefire proposal, he 
nonetheless envisaged the possibility of recourse to violence if the authorities did not respond 
to the call for dialogue. The ECtHR focussed on a passage in the article that it considered as a 
barely veiled threat against the authorities, and an instruction to PKK-sympathisers and the 
armed members of the PKK. In particular it referred to Öcalan’s statement that ‘should the 
path of dialogue not develop, 2005 will necessarily be a year of transition to guerrilla 
warfare, even if this is not what they wish’. According to the Court this passage could be 
regarded as public provocation to commit a terrorist offence within the meaning of Article 5 
of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (CPT). It also referred 
to the fact that Öcalan called for a ‘gathering of patriots’ under the banner of the illegal 
organisation Kongra-Gel. Having regard to the nature, purpose and previous actions of the 
latter organisation, the ECtHR found that this appeal amounted to a message aimed at 
recruitment for terrorism within the meaning of Article 6 CPT. 
 
In consequence, having regard to the identity of Öcalan as the imprisoned leader of the PKK, 
to the violent acts committed by the illegal organisation that he had led; to the content of the 
impugned passages in Öcalan’s statements, containing a threat and an instruction concerning 
possible acts of violence to be committed by PKK members; and referring to the fragile 
context of a proposed ceasefire by Kongra-Gel in which these statements were made, the 
ECtHR came to the conclusion that Öcalan’s statements, read as a whole, could be interpreted 
as incitement to or a call for the use of violence, armed resistance or an uprising. The ECtHR 
clarified this was so despite the fact that Öcalan’s call to violence had been made only in a 
conditional form, namely should dialogue not be developed before 2005. In fact, these 
statements gave the public – and in particular the members of the PKK – the impression that, 
if the conditions put forward by Kongra-Gel were not met, recourse to violence would be 
necessary and justified in 2005. 
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Whilst it was true that the applicants as publisher and editor-in-chief had not been personally 
associated with the statements, they had, however, provided a forum to Öcalan and had 
enabled his statements to be disseminated. The ECtHR referred in this regard to its judgment 
in Jersild v. Denmark in which it stated that ‘[t]he punishment of a journalist for assisting in 
the dissemination of statements made by another person in an interview would seriously 
hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest and should not 
be envisaged unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so’. The Court also 
reiterated that the automatic repression against media professionals on the basis of Article 6 § 
2 of the law no. 3713 without considering their aims or the public’s right to be informed of 
other views on a conflict, could not be reconciled with the freedom to receive or impart 
information or ideas (see also Ali Gürbüz v. Turkey and Gözel and Özer v. Turkey). 
 
However, given that the contested statements could effectively be interpreted as an 
incitement to violence, the Court is of the opinion that the applicants could not, in their 
respective capacities as owner and editor-in-chief of their newspaper, be exempted from all 
liability. According to the Court the right to impart information could not serve as an alibi or 
pretext for disseminating statements by terrorist groups. Moreover, the contested interference 
had not been disproportionate, given, firstly, the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the 
national authorities in such cases and, secondly, the statute-barring and suspended sentence 
from which the applicants had benefited respectively. Therefore, the Court, by six votes to 
one, held that the applicants’ criminal prosecution on the basis Article 6 § 2 of the law no 
3713 on the prevention of terrorism has not violated Article 10 ECHR.  
  
Comment 
 
The first point is that for over two decades, when considering whether a restriction on 
freedom of expression is consistent with Article 10, the Court has consistently applied a 
fundamental standard of review: the Court (a) ‘has to determine whether the reasons adduced 
by the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient’, and (b) ‘has to satisfy itself 
that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles 
embodied in Article 10’. It is a simple, but powerful, principle: the European Court must 
determine whether national courts provided sufficient reasons to justify a restriction of free 
expression, and the European Court must satisfy itself that national courts applied standards 
consistent with Article 10. Crucially, this is not a discretionary standard of review, but 
mandatory: the Court ‘has to determine’ and ‘has to satisfy itself’ of these elements. 
 
And this is not some fringe principle, gathered from a hodgepodge of obscure admissibility 
decisions from the 1970s. It is a fundamental principle that has been applied consistently by 
the Court since Jersild v. Denmark; and by the 17-judge Grand Chamber in many of its 
landmark Article 10 judgments (e.g., Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania; Von Hannover v 
Germany (No. 2), Morice v. France; Delfi AS v. Estonia; and Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy 
and Satamedia Oy v. Finland). As such, where national courts do not provide reasons which 
are relevant and sufficient; or do not apply standards which are in conformity with Article 10, 
it necessarily follows that there has been a violation of Article 10, as found recently in 
judgments such as Kablis v. Russia or Brzeziński v. Poland (see here and here). This approach 
was recently confirmed in Aydemir and Karavil v. Turkey, where the Court observed that the 
domestic court’s judgment ‘does not contain any information as to the reasons why the 
applicants were found guilty of disseminating propaganda in support of the PKK. Besides, 
the first-instance court did not examine whether the text of the petition could be construed as 
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encouraging violence, armed resistance or an uprising, or being capable of inciting to 
violence, which are essential elements to be taken into account’. The Court found that the 
reasons adduced by the national courts to justify the applicants’ criminal conviction under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Law no. 3713 were not ‘relevant and sufficient’ for the purposes of 
Article 10 ECHR. Without analysing itself the text of the statements by the PKK the Court 
concluded that Article 10 was violated. 
 
And yet, the majority in Gürbüz and Bayar have utterly upended this Article 10 standard of 
review, by holding that, in effect, it does not matter that the national courts did not adduce 
sufficient reasons justifying a newspaper editor’s conviction under terrorism legislation; and 
it is completely irrelevant that the national courts did not even attempt to apply standards that 
were in conformity with Article 10 principles. The majority openly admit that the Turkish 
courts’ reasoning was ‘insufficient’ and ‘even completely absent’. But rather than simply 
finding a violation of Article 10 based on the total absence of the Article 10 principles 
applied by the Turkish courts, the Second Section majority did something quite 
extraordinary: it stated that ‘the Court itself will analyse the statements’, then concluded they 
constituted ‘incitement to violence’ (even though this was not even the offence involved), and 
there was thus no violation of Article 10. 
 
The Court offered two authorities for its approach, namely paragraph 34 of Falakaoğlu and 
Saygılı v. Turkey; and paragraph 28 of Saygılı and Falakaoğlu v. Turkey (no. 2); stating that 
in these cases the Court itself examined the articles at issue, even though the domestic court 
reasoning was ‘manifestly insufficient’. But neither of these paragraphs, nor indeed, the 
entire judgments, say anything about the proposition the Court has authority to itself 
determine statements as incitement to violence where domestic courts fail to adduce reasons 
or apply standards in conformity with Article 10. And nowhere in these judgments does the 
Court say the domestic courts’ reasoning was ‘manifestly insufficient’. Indeed, in Saygılı and 
Falakaoğlu (No. 2), the Turkish courts explicitly applied principles from Article 10 case law, 
including Zana v. Turkey; and the European Court explicitly held that the ‘reasons adduced 
by the authorities for the applicants’ conviction are “relevant and sufficient”’. Nowhere in 
these judgments does the Court hold that it is departing from the fundamental principle of 
Article 10 review that the Court (a) ‘has to determine whether the reasons adduced by the 
national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufficient’, and (b) ‘has to satisfy itself that 
the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles 
embodied in Article 10’. Thus, the majority’s approach in Gürbüz and Bayar is very 
questionable under Article 10 case law. The Court should simply have found a violation of 
Article 10. 
 
Indeed, the Gürbüz and Bayar majority admitted that the Turkish courts imposed the 
convictions solely on the grounds that the newspaper had published statements by a terrorist 
organisation, and without carrying out any analysis of the article’s content or context. The 
majority even admitted that there was authority directly on this point: in Gözel and Özer v. 
Turkey the Court unanimously found a violation of Article 10 over similar convictions under 
the same provision of anti-terrorism legislation, holding that ‘such automatic repression, 
without taking into account the objectives of media professionals or the right of the public to 
be informed of another view of a conflict  situation, could not be reconciled with the freedom 
to receive or impart information or ideas’. And yet, the Second Section’s majority decided 
that it would not apply Gözel and Özer.   
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Second, even if it would be legitimate to review the newspaper article’s content, the majority 
arguably failed to apply the appropriate test for incitement to violence: the Court must be 
satisfied that (a) the ‘intent’ of the speaker was to incite hostility or violence; and (b) there 
was a ‘clear and imminent danger’ of violence resulting from the expression. Again, this is 
not some fringe test; it was unanimously applied by the Court only a few months ago in 
Savva Terentyev v. Russia (see here); and in other judgments such as Gül and Others v. 
Turkey (para. 42); and Kılıç and Eren v. Turkey (para. 29). It is the test applied not only under 
Article 10 standards, but also under international human rights standards, as reiterated by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression (see here). And yet, the considerations of 
intent and imminent danger of violence are completely absent from the majority’s judgment. 
It is difficult to see how the test would be satisfied, as the majority admit that the applicants 
had ‘not personally associated themselves’ with the statements. 
 
Indeed, it was very relevant from a journalistic point to report on the differences of approach 
between the leaders of Kongra-Gel and PKK, without determining the newspaper itself had 
the intent to incite to violence by reproducing in particular the statements of Öcalan. The 
essence is that the Court showed insufficient attention to the role of journalism and media 
reporting by automatically considering that the dissemination of a statement coming from a 
terrorist group cannot serve as a pretext and is by itself to give ‘a forum’ to a terrorist 
organisation. This approach completely undercuts the Jersild principle that seeks to protects 
media interviewers, as also in the Jersild case the interviewed Greenjackets manifestly 
incited to hatred and violence, but the ECtHR in that landmark judgment rightly found that 
the intention of the journalist was not to incite to hatred or violence, but to report on an 
important issue of public interest. It is entirely unclear why the majority in Gurbuz and Bayar 
did not consider itself bound by the seminal Jersild judgment, which has been so central to 
Article 10 jurisprudence for over two decades, providing an important shield to journalists 
across Council of Europe member states, where prosecutors have sought to target the media 
for critical reporting on matters of public interest. 
  
Importantly, it must be noted that there was clearly some unease within the Second Section 
on the approach taken. The concurring opinion by Judge Spano and Judge Bårdsen stressed 
the importance of ‘subsidiarity’, but then, in a complete about-turn, held that where it is 
‘manifestly clear’ that content is incitement to violence or hate speech, the Court can adopt 
the majority’s approach. But the concurring opinion provided no authority for such a 
principle, and it smacks of the type of language used in heavily criticised German legislation 
(e.g., here and here). The concurring opinion is clearly aware of the danger in such an 
approach, and stated that in ‘borderline’ cases, the Court should not ‘come to the rescue’ 
where domestic court reasoning is deficient under Article 10. But again, the concurring 
opinion provide no authority for such a limiting principle. Finally, there was one dissenting 
opinion by Judge Pavli, built heavily around Article 10 case law, and finding a violation of 
Article 10. The opinion criticises the majority opinion for ‘revers[ing] the fundamental logic’ 
of Article 10 review, and that the approach invites national courts to ‘not take the trouble’ to 
carry out careful Article 10 review. And even if such an approach were adopted, the 
dissenting opinion robustly criticises the deficient Article 10 analysis applied by the majority 
under the Court’s case law on incitement to violence. Judge Pavli concluded that the 
majority’s opinion was based on a ‘triple pirouette’ that ‘ignores fundamental aspects of our 
well-established jurisprudence’. 
